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SELLING NEW SHARES AT LESS THAN PAR.
HANDLEY V. STUTZ, 139 U. S. 417.
COMPANY OF INDIA v. ROPER,
MINING
GOLD
OOREGum

[1892] A. C.

125, H. L.
The recent affirmance by the law lords of the House of Lords
of the doctrine that a subscriber to the shares of a corporation
is liable for the last penny of the unpaid portion of his shares, is
in such striking contrast to the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Handley v. Stutz, as to be worthy of
special examination. The decision is also notable as being the first
distinct utterance of the English court of last resort on a question
which, although pronounced on by the Court of Appeal, was
still regarded as debatable. It may therefore be justly classed
as a "leading case " on a very important question of the law of
private corporations.
The case is that of The Ooregum Gold Mining Company of
India v. Roper, and is reported in [1892] A. (. 125, H. L.
The facts were these. The Ooregum Gold Mining Company,
being on the verge of bankruptcy, held a general meeting of
the stockholders at which it was voted to issue 120,000 preference shares, at £1 each, to be sold and issued as fully paid up
for 5s. per share. At that time the ordinary shares were worth
but 2s. 6d. per share. In pursuance of this resolution upwards
of 100,000 preference shares were sold at 5s. per share, and the
transaction duly registered in accordance with the statute. The
capital so raised tided the company over its difficulties, and, by
the fortunate discovery of rich gold deposits, it became so
prosperous that its ordinary shares sold for 40s. in the market.
Some four years after these preference shares were issued,
Roper purchased on the stock exchange some of the ordinary
shares of the company. Soon after he brought an action against
the company, and one Wallroth (as an original allottee of preference shares and trustee for the others) to have the issue of
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preference shares at 15s. discount declared ultra vires, and to

compel the holders of such shares to pay into the company the
15s. per share remaining unpaid. As a more special ground of
relief he alleged that certain debentures issued by the company
were made a charge on all its property, whereas, if these preference shares were fully paid, the sum so realized would cover

the :,debentures, and extinguish the general liability of the,
company.
When this case reached the House of Lords on appeal, it was
a case of first impression so far as that court was concerned.
The Court of Appeal had, it is true, decided the question;
in 1888, in the case of the Almada and Tirito Company,'
but that decision could not control the court of last resort, and
was in this case to be either approved or disapproved.

The question involved was precisely the same question
as was involved in i1andley v. Stutz. 2 That question, as stated
by one of the law lords, was, "whether it is or is not
competent for a company limited by shares to issue shares at a,
discount so as to relieve persons taking shares so issued from
liability to pay up their amount in full. It was suggested that
different considerations might apply to shares in the capital with
which a company is originally registered and shares in additional
capital created afterwards." The question as stated by Mr.
Justice Brown, in Handley v. Stutz, was, "whether an active
corporation, or as it is called in some cases, a ' going concern,'
finding its original capital impaired-by loss or misfortune, may
not, for the purpose of recuperating itself and providing new
conditions for the successful prosecution of its business, issue
new stock, put it upon the market and sell it for the best price
that can be obtained."
In Handley v. Stutz the Supreme Court also declares the
question to be a new one, and that the court is, consequently,
"not embarrassed by any previous decision on the point."
We have, therefore, these two cases, involving practically the
same question, each decided in the court of last resort, each
declared to be (with what show of reason in the case of the
1 38 Ch.

D. 415. '
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American court need not be considered) without precedent,: and
each of the very highest importance to the commercial world.
The decision in Handley.v. Stutz is well known to ,the profession and has provoked more discussion in professional- circles
than any other decision of the Supreme: Court in recent years.
That decision is, in effect, that a corporation -may, when it -is
necessary or desirable to increase its- capital stock,,sell the new
stock for what it can get, and that the purchasers are, not liable
either to the corporation or to creditors for the difference
between the amount paid by. them for their shares and the par
value of the shares.
The decision in Ooregum Gold Mining lompany.of india :v.
Roper, is precisely the opposite. The House of Lords expressly
holds that where a corporation puts its new stock on the market
and sells it for the best price it can get, - in this case for double
-what the old stock was selling for, -the purchasers axe liable for
the difference between what they paid and the par value of the
stock, not only to the creditors of the corporation, but also to
the corporation itself. In the opinion read by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Halsbury), he says: "It may be that such limitations on the power of the company
to manage its own affairs may occasionally be inconvenient, and
prevent its obtaining money for the purposes of its trading. on
terms so favorable as it could do if it were more free to act.
But, speaking for myself, I recognize the wisdom of enforcing
on a company the disclosure of what its real capital is 'and not
permitting a statement of its affairs to be such as may mislead
and deceive those who are either about to become its shareholders
or about to give it credit.
" I think, with Fry, L. J., in the Almada and Tirito Company's Case, that the question which your Lordships have to
solve is one which may be answered by reference to an inquiry:
What is the nature of an agreement to take a share in a limited
company? And that question may be answered by saying, that it
is an agreement to become liable to pay to the company -the
amount for which the share has been created. That .agreement
is one which the company itself has no authority to alter or
qualify, and I am therefore of. opinion that * * * the
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company were prohibited by law, upon the principle laid down in
Ashbury Company v. Riche I from doing that which is compendiously described as issuing shares at a discount."
It is true that the decision in this case turned upon the clauses
in the Companies Acts of 1862 and 1867 limiting the liability of
members to the amount unpaid on their shares, but as those
clauses merely enact a principle, which has always been recognized and enforced by the American courts ever since the cases
of Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308, and Sawyer v. Hoag, 17
Wall. 610, the case has precisely the same force as if the
statutory provision were, as with us, embodied in judicial rules.
The real point in issue in both the English and American cases
was whether the rule should be extended to new issues of stock
put upon the market by a company already organized.
The only dissent from the decision of the House of Lords in
this case was by Lord Herschell, who, while assenting to the
general doctrine announced by the court, thought it ought to be
applied only in a "winding-up " of the affairs of the company,
"and then only so far as necesssary for the discharge of the
obligations of the company and the costs of the winding-up."
His argument upon this point would probably commend itself to
the profession in this country, and is certainly in accordance
with the doctrine of the American courts previous to Hlandley v.
Stutz. Indeed, had Handley v. Stutz not been decided some
year and a half before Ooreguin Gold Mining Company of india
v. Roper, the American lawyer who chanced to read the latter
case in the English reports would undoubtedly have said that
Lord Herschell's opinion was in entire accord with the American
doctrine. It is founded in reason, in justice, and in commercial
convenience. It enables a corporation to make such contracts
with its own members as may best subserve the interests of the
parties concerned, while it protects the public generally, and
creditors specifically, against injuries resulting to them from
such contracts. It avoids the stringency of the English rule on
the one side and the looseness of the new American rule on the
other. It marks, so to speak, the point of rest of the pendulum
I
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between the extremes of judicial decisions. Medium tenuere
beati.
Prophecy is a thankless office, and has even been a dangerous
one. But I venture to add, that if the uneasiness of the legal
mind at the decision in Handley v. Stutz means anything it
means that the reason and conscience of the profession have
been shocked at the doctrine in that case and will not again be
at rest until the earlier doctrine, and the doctrine in Ooregum
-Gold Mining Company of India v. Roper, as limited by Lord
Herschell, is firmly re-established.
ERNEST WILSON HUFFCIJT.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, CHICAGO.

